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The Southern Gas Corridor in its geopolitical environment
by Stefan Meister
Summary / Zusammenfassung
The Southern Gas Corridor was initiated by the European Commission to 
develop the necessary infrastructure between the wider Caspian region and Europe, 
in large part in order to diversify the EU’s supply of gas away from Russia. 
Given this goal, discussion of the corridor and its key pipeline, the Nabucco 
project, have been politicized from the very beginning. The selection of the much 
smaller TAP and TANAP pipelines over Nabucco is above all an economic 
decision by the participating companies, which illustrates the limits of political 
influence on such expensive and complex investments. At the moment Azerbaijan 
is the only contributor to the Southern Gas Corridor, a country whose main inter-
ests are in further diversifying its export paths away from Russian pipelines and 
earning money in the EU . Nevertheless, the entire region—with Iranian, Iraqi, 
and Caspian gas—has huge energ y potential for the EU.
Energiesicherheit im Südkaukasus
Der Südliche Gaskorridor in seinem geopolitischen Umfeld
von Stefan Meister
Der Südliche Gaskorridor wurde von der Europäischen Kommission initiiert, 
um die Gasversorgung der EU unabhängiger von Russland zu entwickeln und 
die kaspische Region mit Europa zu verbinden. Diese Politik war von Anfang 
an politisiert, da das Kernprojekt des Südlichen Gaskorridors, nämlich Nabucco, 
vor allem als Alternative zu russischem Gas diskutiert worden ist. Die Ent-
scheidung der beteiligten Firmen gegen Nabucco und für TAP ist in erster Linie 
eine ökonomische Entscheidung, die die Grenzen von politischem Einfluss auf  
diese komplexen Investitionen zeigt. Im Moment ist Aserbaidschan der einzige 
Lieferant für den Südlichen Gaskorridor. Bakus Hauptinteresse ist, seine Ener-
gieexporte stärker von Russland zu diversifizieren und Geld in der EU zu 
verdienen. Jedoch hat die gesamte Region mit iranischem, irakischem und kaspi-
schem Gas ein enormes Potenzial für Energielieferungen.
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Energy Security in the South Caucasus
The Southern Gas Corridor in its geopolitical environment
by Stefan Meister
The Southern Gas Corridor
The Southern Gas Corridor was initiated by the 
European Commission (EC) to diversify the EU’s 
supply of gas and develop the necessary infrastruc-
ture to transport gas from the Caspian region and 
Middle East—primarily Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Iran, and Iraq—to Europe. One main reason for 
the corridor is to create a supply route alternative 
to Russian pipelines and reserves. Due to political 
and economic concerns as well as a lack of devel-
oped gas resources and infrastructure, Azerbaijan 
remains the sole partner for this policy. The Azeri 
gas field Shah Deniz 2 was slated to be the main 
contributor to many highly contested pipeline proj-
ects: Nabucco (or a shorter version called Nabucco 
West); the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy 
(ITGI); the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and 
SEEP (South East European Pipeline). Following 
the Shaz Deniz consortium’s decision in its favor 
in June 2013, TAP and TANAP will become the 
main link between Azerbaijan and the EU for 
the foreseeable future. A considerable number of 
investors are involved in this mega-project along 
the entire chain (SOCAR – State Oil Company 
of Azerbaijan Republic, BP, Total, Statoil, Botas, 
E.ON and others), which is reported to need 
above 40 billion dollars of investment this decade: 
a projected 28 billion dollars for producing the 
gas in Azerbaijan and transport it to the Turkish-
Georgian border alone.
But TAP is only one important link in the chain 
between Azerbaijan and Europe. Gas will run 
through existing infrastructure, traveling first 
through the South Caucasus Pipeline crossing 
Azerbaijani and Georgian territory to eastern 
Turkey. From there it will be transported by the 
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), a joint ven-
ture of SOCAR, Turkish Botas and BP. SOCAR 
holds an 68%share in that project, 12% BP, 20% 
Botas. TANAP will run across Turkish territory 
with a capacity of 16 bcm (billion cubic meters) 
per year—6 bcm delivered to Turkey and 10 bcm 
to Europe. Thereafter the pipeline will connect to 
TAP (developed by Norway’s Statoil, Switzerland’s 
EGL, and Germany’s E.ON) at the Greek border, 
shipping 10 bcm of gas per year with the option to 
increase capacity to 20 bcm in the future (compare 
to the original Nabucco project of 31 bcm annu-
ally). It will run from Greece to Albania and under 
the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy.
The European Commission’s strategic objective 
of the Southern Gas Corridor was to meet 10 
to 20 percent of the EU’s expected gas demand 
by 2020—in other words, 45 to 90 bcm per year. 
Pushed by the EC as a highly strategic geopolitical 
project, the geographical, commercial, and politi-
cal realities have largely been ignored. Russia and 
Iran have no interest in a Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
which bypasses their territories. Furthermore there 
are unsolved legal disputes about the legal status 
of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijani capacities are 
limited, holding just 0,7 percent of the world’s gas 
resources. Azeri production capacities are substan-
tial, further significant increases over the current 
projections, however, seem rather very long-term 
options. Northern Iraqi gas must be transported 
through Syria—for the unforeseeable future a 
huge security risk—or through Turkey which 
would link the Kurdish controlled Northern Iraq 
and Turkey. Although the situation in Iran may 
change, many question marks remain. In the end, 
economic feasibility to shoulder such investments 
plus the commercial interests of the energy compa-
nies operating in the upstream sector are the main 
drivers of corridor development, not the EC’s 
political agenda. Nevertheless, the Commission 
has ignored the differing and divergent priorities 
of the member states, some of which supported or 
were otherwise involved in alternative projects.
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The Role of Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has become the key player in the South-
ern Gas Corridor, both because of the surplus 
gas available for export and its desire to diversify 
its energy exports away from Russian streams by 
developing alternative pipelines directly to Europe. 
It is at the moment the only country able to supply 
the EU with a significant amount of gas through 
the corridor, but there is huge potential in the 
region considering its connections to Turkmeni-
stan, northern Iraq, and possibly Iran—and, to an 
uncertain extent, East Mediterranean Gas. 
For Azerbaijan, the export of oil and especially of 
gas is the most important economic sector. Energy 
contributes 55 percent to its GDP and is the big-
gest source of export revenues. Even if diversi-
fication plays an important role in the strategic 
planning of the country, energy exports will long 
remain the key driver of its economy. Georgia is an 
important ally in the region because it is the main 
transit country for resources from Azerbaijan to 
Europe. As a second transit country, Turkey plays 
a key role, but at the same time participates in Rus-
sian pipeline projects like South Stream. The goal 
of the Turkish government is to become an energy 
hub to Europe. 
Azerbaijan finds itself in a difficult geopolitical 
environment, with critical relations with Iran, a 
balancing policy towards Russia, and conflict 
zones in the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and Georgia. The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 
demonstrated the vulnerability of the transit 
system to Europe. Although Russia has never 
attacked the pipelines, its occupation of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia shows the potential for con-
flict and the challenge to long-term security of the 
pipeline system. For the foreign policy of Azer-
baijan the export of oil and gas to Europe while 
bypassing Russia plays a central role in the balance 
of power between Russia and the West. 
A Trans-Caspian Pipeline would be very expen-
sive, yet remains a competitive option as China is 
interested in increasing gas supply from Turkmeni-
stan. At the same time Azerbaijan has no interest 
in competing with Turkmen gas on the European 
market. Iran is still under Western sanctions, but 
under new President Hassan Rohani it is conceiv-
able that the US and EU might lift these measures, 
increasing the likelihood of access to Iran’s sub-
stantial holdings: the world’s fourth-largest proven 
oil reserves and second-largest natural gas reserves.
With the implementation of TANAP, Azerbaijan 
has demonstrated that it is able and willing to com-
plete projects despite Russian political and energy 
interests. Azerbaijan plans to export 20 bcm by 
2020 and 40 to 60 bcm by 2025 through the explo-
ration of new gas fields. Frustration over the slow 
progress of Nabucco has led to SOCAR’s stronger 
engagement in construction of the necessary pipe-
line infrastructure between Azerbaijan and South-
ern Europe. In June 2013 SOCAR acquired 66 
percent of the Greek gas transit company DESFA. 
With this investment, Azerbaijan is assuming a 
role on the European market and can influence 
other strategic projects in the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor, such as the Greek-Bulgarian Interconnector 
and interconnector between Turkey and Greece, 
where DESFA has a share. 
The Role of Russia
Russia has an economic and political interest 
in controlling all pipeline projects in the post-
Soviet region; therefore Azerbaijan’s diversifica-
tion policy is a challenge to Moscow. The key 
foreign policy project of Vladimir Putin’s third 
term is the integration of post-Soviet states into 
a Eurasian Economic Union. Azerbaijan is using 
export diversification of its energy resources to 
resist Russian integration pressure. At the same 
time, Russia is developing its alternative pipeline 
project South Stream in cooperation with Gaz-
prom, Italy’s ENI, France’s EDF, and Germany’s 
Wintershall. South Stream, in its final stage, will 
carry 63 bcm per year of Russian gas to Europe 
via the Black Sea, Bulgaria, the Balkans, Hungary, 
Austria, and Greece, thus competing with TAP but 
not directly in its geographical location like with 
Nabucco. Although the volume of TAP is so small, 
EU demand nonetheless exists, so the project is 
economically viable. South Stream will bypass 
Ukraine, undermining the country’s position as 
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the most important transit country for Russian gas 
to Europe.
Energy Security in the South 
Caucasus—the View from 
Azerbaijan
• It is important for Azerbaijan to diversify its 
energy exports away from Russia and also to 
enter the European market with direct customer 
access. For this reason, the country needs eco-
nomic and political partners in the EU. 
• Economic and energy cooperation are the core 
of Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU. The coun-
try has no interest in political change or demo-
cratic reforms, but does have a huge interest in 
becoming an important energy supplier to the 
EU.
• In its geopolitical situation, it is important for 
the country to balance Russia, Iran, and Tur-
key. The EU has become a key economic part-
ner, but expectations that it would become an 
important security partner, too, have not been 
fulfilled. Only the US and Turkey partly play 
this role.
• Because of the Georgian conflict zones and the 
northern Caucasus conflict with Armenia over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, security plays a key role in 
the foreign policy of Azerbaijan. This has a fun-
damental influence on energy policy, given that 
the country seeks partners to balance Russia 
and protect its security needs. 
The Southern Gas Corridor and 
Azerbaijan—the View from the EU
• For the EU, Azerbaijan has become the key 
partner in the Southern Gas Corridor. The 
volumes Azerbaijan can supply will initially 
be rather small by comparison, but the entire 
region has huge potential. For the time being, it 
is important to develop sufficient and expand-
able infrastructure to the Caspian Sea which 
can later be linked with Iran, Iraq, or even 
Turkmenistan.
• The selection of TAP—the smallest of the pipe-
lines—is primarily a pragmatic economic deci-
sion rather than a geopolitical one. It reflects 
the currently limited economic viability of the 
whole Southern Gas Corridor. Azerbaijan has 
limited gas for export. Only if a Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline is constructed or Iran gets involved 
can the Southern Gas Corridor become a seri-
ous element of the EU’s energy diversification 
strategy.
• The decision in favor of TAP over the much 
larger Nabucco shows that political initiatives 
ignoring commercial and economic realities will 
bring either no or suboptimal results. Azerbai-
jan’s decision to supply the EU rather than Rus-
sia with gas is linked more to Azerbaijan’s inter-
est in diversifying its exports than to any effect 
of EU policy or diplomacy. 
• Azerbaijan is part of the Eastern Partnership, 
but the EU is not willing to become a true secu-
rity partner. Azerbaijan must become more real-
istic about what the EU is willing and able to do 
in terms of security policy. At the same time, if 
the EU wants political change in the region and 
a reliable partner in Azerbaijan, it needs to link 
its economic policy with more engagement in 
conflict management.
This DGAPkompakt was written as a back-
ground paper for the participants of the interna-
tional conference “Energy Security in the South 
Caucasus—The Southern Gas Corridor in its 
geopolitical environment”, hosted by the DGAP in 
Berlin on January 30, 2014 with friendly support of 
BP Europe. Author: Dr. Stefan Meister, Associate 
Fellow of the DGAP and Senior Policy Fellow at 
the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
